主讲人：Bob Hancké（伦敦政经学院欧洲所学者） 时间：10:10 ?C 12:00（4月12日、19日、26日三个周四上午） 地点：威尼斯赌场,澳门威尼斯人官网政府管理学院廖凯原楼一层134室     系列讲座简介： In this lecture series I will report on several research projects in progress which discuss the political economy (PE) of Europe (essentially the enlarged EU). The dominant view on the European political economy can be summarised thus: the continent is incapable of generating higher growth ?Cthe core problem for Europe, in my view―because it combines a sensible monetary policy with rigid labour market institutions. As a result of this combination, the continent is stuck with low equilibrium (ie. non-inflationary) growth and high equilibrium unemployment rates. The answer, in the prevailing view, is simple: deregulate labour and product markets. I am very critical of this idea; in the lectures, I will try to show that the orthodox view profoundly  misunderstands the nature and organisation of European economies, and that this misunderstanding has potentially important political consequences. In the Hitchcock movie from which I borrowed the title for these lectures, Harry shows up everywhere, but it’s unclear what he has actually done; in the standard story ‘labour market rigidities’ show up everywhere as well ?Cbut upon closer inspection, it is unclear what exactly they are responsible for.   4月12日：‘The problem with Europe’ In the first lecture I will discuss and criticise the standard view on the European PE in its many forms. Whoever makes the argument, however, the basic points are always the same: the problem with Europe is its supply-side: while product and capital markets have been integrated, largely along deregulatory lines, labour markets are not only very poorly integrated, but are notoriously over-regulated. In its classical interpretation, labour market institutions have never been very helpful in sorting In its most benign interpretation, this has allowed the continent to grow fast for most of the post-war period and almost match (in fact, sometimes surpass) US productivity and growth levels. In a world of unpredictable product markets, however, this ‘co-ordinated’ form of capitalism is running out of steam, and this explains the large differences in economic performance between the Anglo-Saxon economies and the continent. I will first review the historical evidence for the standard view and then discuss the theoretical underpinnings of both the standard and the benign view. I will then develop a different argument, which foreshadows elements in the two lectures to come. In essence the argument builds on three (in my view) plausible assumptions: (a) if we live in a Heckscher-Olin world with a prevalence of specific over generic assets (as I think Europe does), (b) if economic integration leads to increased specialisation (as standard trade theory would predict), and (c) if we assume a product life cycle (in which radical technologies mature and give way to stable commercial applications), then European economies are, in fact, quite well-equipped to deal with a new technological regime (assuming that is what we are facing today). Their domestic institutions, especially those in the labour market, allow for a mobilisation and flexible deployment and combination of skills that would suit the middle stages of technological evolution. The lecture will illustrate these points with examples and analyses.   4月19日：The political economy of capitalism in Central Europe The second lecture deals with the emergence of capitalism in Central Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In the standard story, the success of economies in CEE after their inevitable transition recession has been due primarily to the low level of regulation, and especially the ability of these economies to compete on wage costs (and offering relatively high skills in return). Along this argument, the region is increasingly divided into two, possibly three groups. The Baltic states are the first: their performance will be strong, precisely because they have adopted a combination of low wage costs and an extremely low corporate tax rate of 0%. Among the others, performance will vary to the extent that they also have deregulated their economies, and especially their labour markets, as well. Part of this argument is epitomised in the account of privatisation: mass privatisations, in which the economy is handed to the citizens, who can then sell their shares in companies as they see fit, allow markets to sort out the structure and organisation of the economy. Against this view two arguments I develop two arguments. One is that the bulk of exports and GDP in most new member-states in Central Europe is produced primarily in companies that that were sold off strategically to strong foreign investors who were forced to produce a convincing long-term business plan. In addition, the nature of FDI conditions success of these economies. While they are obviously highly dependent upon developments in the West, those economies that have attracted foreign capital with high fixed costs (engineering and automobile manufacturing are the prime examples) appear to be moving slowly in the direction of a co-ordinated market economy, in which firms upgrade their processes and products by relying on workforce skills. In contrast to the conventional story, therefore, the countries with low cost barriers to entry and exit, such as the Baltics are disproportionately disadvantaged in the long run, while the small economies in the Visegrad 4 and Slovenia appear poised to develop strong medium to high value-added export sectors.   4月26日：Rethinking EMU The final lecture analyses EMU and will argue that the political-economic basis of EMU is considerably more fragile than commonly thought. the argument proceeds in three steps. Despite the official view, the Euro-zone is de facto still an asymmetric monetary arrangement, with Germany (still) at its core. However, in contrast to the situation in the monetary arrangements that preceded it, within EMU Germany is stuck paying a disproportionately high price: outside EMU, German growth could be considerably higher, and its unemployment rate lower. The conventional view on Germany within EMU (ECB and Commission) is that the country needs to deregulate its labour markets and the unemployment will start to fall. Since that is precisely what Germany has been doing since the mid-1990s, this view now no longer seems to hold as much sway, even within the OECD who proclaimed it, as it did ten-fifteen years ago. Under such circumstances, it is far from impossible that powerful groups within the German political economy, both Left and Right, start questioning the wisdom of EMU, and that the resentment within the German population over abandoning the Deutschmark in favour of the Euro is organised by these interests. If this happens, the only country that could credibly leave the Euro, might eventually be compelled to do so, and the Euro will be history ?Cpossibly dragging the entire post-war European construction along in its fall.   阅读次数：